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Many contemporary theoretic studies of trade over geography reduce to an ex-
amination of constant-elasticity reactions to changes in iceberg trade costs. These
impacts are readily analyzed in simple constant-returns models based on the Arm-
ington (1969) assumption of regionally di®erentiated goods. Following the line of
reasoning suggested by Arkolakis et al. (2008) one can reach the surprising conclu-
sion that industrial organization does not matter. In the present paper, we show
that this ¯nding is fragile, and with a minor elaboration of their model, the rich
industrial-organization features of the popular Melitz (2003) model do, in fact, gen-
erate important di®erences for trade and welfare.
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1 Introduction
Arkolakis et al. (2008) show that, given appropriate parameterization to match trade
responses, many contemporary theoretic models of trade over geography generate equiv-
alent gains from trade. We can push this result further to show equivalence between a
¤Corresponding author: Engineering Hall 311, Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School
of Mines, Golden, CO 80401-1887, USA; email: ebalistr@mines.edu; voice: (303) 384-2156; fax:
(303) 273-3416.model based on the Melitz (2003) theory of heterogeneous ¯rms and a simple constant-
returns model based on the Armington (1969) assumption of trade in regional aggregates.
We show, however, that this result is fragile. Addition of a second sector which competes
for factor services breaks the equivalence. That is, if the elasticity of factor supply to
the traded sector is larger than zero the models will produce divergent assessments of the
impact of commercial policy on trade and welfare.
2 Models
Our analysis begins with two models calibrated to a common benchmark dataset, one
model based on Melitz (2003) and another based on Armington (1969) as elaborated
by Devarajan et al. (1993). In our simulations we include three regions (indexed by r
or s). Each region is endowed with a primary factor (labor) which can be used in a
traded sector or directly consumed as leisure. Trade theories concerning these models are
well developed in the literature, so we simply present our notation and the equilibrium
conditions for each model. The theoretical setup employed by Arkolakis et al. (2008)
is a special case of the Melitz model when we parameterize it such that the implied
factor-supply elasticity to the traded sector is zero.1
Tables 1 and 2 de¯ne our notation, and the algebraic formulation of the alternative
models is presented in Table 3.
Given the initial conditions and values of the ¯xed parameters, the calibrated pa-
rameters of the Melitz model are found by inverting the equilibrium conditions. The
Armington distribution parameters (the »rs) are calculated such that the Armington and
Melitz models have identical benchmark trade °ows.
In the calibration we choose labor and welfare units such that the initial wages and
true-cost-of-living indexes are one; w0
r = e0
r = 1. This is a convenient choice because it
1Our setup is equivalent to having a second constant-returns sector which uses only labor. The labor
supply elasticity to the traded sector is zero either when the value share of the non-traded sector is zero
or when preferences are Cobb-Douglas.
2Table 1: Variables
Melitz Armington
Welfare: Wr X X
Unit expenditure index: er X X
Price index on traded composite: Pr X X
Nominal demand for traded composite: Vr X X
Number of entered ¯rms: Mr X
Number of operating ¯rms: Nrs X
Average-¯rm revenues: ~ rrs X
Average-¯rm price: ~ prs X
Average-¯rm productivity: ~ 'rs X
Wage: wr X X
Nominal income: Yr X X
Table 2: Parameters
Fixed parameters:
Pareto shape parameter: a = 3.4
Pareto lower support: b = 0.2
Substitution elasticity Melitz varieties: ¾M = 3.8
Substitution elasticity Armington varieties: ¾A = 4.4 (= a + 1)
Probability of ¯rm death: ± = 0.05
Value share of traded sector: ° = 0.5
Labor endowment ¹ L = 2/3
Instruments:
Iceberg trade-cost factor: ¿rs
Top-level substitution elasticity
between traded and non-traded goods: ®
Assumed initial conditions:
Benchmark home-market trade cost factor: ¿0
rr = 1.0
Benchmark external-market trade cost factor: ¿0
rs = 2.0 (8r 6= s)
Benchmark number of entered ¯rms: m0
r = 10
Benchmark number of operating home ¯rms: n0
rr = 9.5
Benchmark number of operating export ¯rms: n0
rs = 0.6 (8r 6= s)
Calibrated parameters:
Fixed operating-cost on r to s link: frs
Fixed cost of productivity draw: fe
r
Preference weight on traded sector: ÃT
Preference weight on non-traded sector: ÃL
Armington bilateral CES weights: »rs
3Table 3: Algebraic Conditions
Melitz Armington (eq.)
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Yr = wr¹ L X X (10)
Welfare:
Wr = Yr=er X X (11)
a If ® = 1 this reverts to the familiar Cobb-Douglas form.
4simpli¯es our calculation of the elasticity of labor supply available to the traded sector
of the economy. The relevant residual labor supply function is given by








which is derived from equation (9a). Substituting in the unit expenditure function and
Yr = wr¹ Lr, and then calculating the elasticity evaluated at the benchmark (w = e(w) =
1), yields




So, we use the instrument, ®, to control the implied labor supply elasticity. If we set
® = 1 then the elasticity is zero and we have a model that is consistent with Arkolakis
et al. (2008).2
3 Experiment and Results
In order to compare the Armington versus Melitz models we compute a simple experiment
where we eliminate iceberg trade costs between regions one and two. Using the instrument
®, we control the implied labor-supply elasticity (´) faced by the trade sectors. Setting
the Armington elasticity as suggested by Arkolakis et al. (2008) (¾A = a + 1), we ¯nd
that the welfare impacts of removing the iceberg costs are di®erent across the models,
except in the special case that the implied labor-supply elasticity is exactly zero.
Figure 1 plots the region-1 welfare impact of reductions in trade-costs as a function of
the implied labor-supply elasticity. Notice that the welfare impacts are only equivalent
at ´ = 0. The results for region 2 are identical to region 1, because of the symmetry built
into our illustrative model. Figure 2 shows the welfare impacts on the third region for
the same set of experiments. Although the curves in Figure 2 intersect twice, it is only
2We also ran experiments where we ¯xed ® = 3 and calibrated ° to the assumed labor-supply elasticity.
Again, at values of ´ above zero the models did not generate the same results. It is only in the special
case that ° = 1 is equivalence between the Armington and Melitz models is obtained.






































Implied Factor-supply Elasticity for Traded Sector
Armington
Melitz
at ´ = 0 that we have equivalence in the models across the multiregion equilibrium.
One key feature of the environment set up by Arkolakis et al. (2008) is that the number
of entered ¯rms is una®ected by changes in iceberg costs. Labor supply is perfectly
inelastic so all of the adjustments in ¯rm revenues and number of operating ¯rms shows
up in the wage. Changes in nominal entry costs are mirrored by changes in expected
pro¯ts, so equation (6) is satis¯ed with no changes in Mr. At ´ 6= 0, however, the wage
only partially absorbs the adjustments in the industrial organization and Mr changes. In
Table 4 we present the basic industrial organization in the Melitz model in the benchmark
and in scenarios with di®erent labor supply responses. At ´ = 1 we have entry as labor
is drawn into the Melitz sector.
At ´ = 0 Table 4 shows the \anti-variety e®ect" emphasized by Baldwin and Forslid
(forthcoming) where the new import varieties generated by trade liberalization are more
than o®set by lost domestic varieties. Notice, however, that the total number of varieties
consumed in region 1 goes from 10.69 in the benchmark to 11.77 in the scenario, when
´ = 1. The anti-variety e®ect is dominated when there is enough response in factor








































Implied Factor-supply Elasticity for Traded Sector
Armington
Melitz
Table 4: Heterogeneous-¯rms model region-1 entry and consumption of varieties
Benchmark Scenario Scenario
´ = 0 ´ = 1
Entered Firms: M1 10.00 10.00 12.30
Varieties Consumed: N1;1 9.50 5.47 6.77
N2;1 0.59 3.61 4.47
N3;1 0.59 0.48 0.53
Total Varieties:
P




7supplies. Feenstra (forthcoming) emphasizes, however, that because these varieties enter
the expenditure system at di®erent prices we cannot simply count up varieties and infer
variety gains or losses. Feenstra shows that variety gains, when comparing equilibriums
t versus t ¡ 1, are given by deviations in the ratio (¸t
r=¸t¡1
r )¡1=(¾M¡1) from unity, where
¸z
r represents region-r's share of expenditures at equilibrium z on goods available in
both equilibria to the total expenditures at z. We con¯rm the Feenstra (forthcoming)
analytical result that there are no import-variety gains or losses in the Melitz structure
(for the case that ´ = 0), but we ¯nd that the variety gains reemerge when we allow
resources to be drawn into the Melitz sector.
To emphasize fundamental di®erences between the Armington and Melitz models we
look at trade °ows. In the case that ´ = 0 the trade patterns before and after the removal
of trade costs are identical. One might think that ¾A parameter can be set to match the
trade reactions in the Melitz model when ´ 6= 0, but this is not the case. If we adjust ¾A
to match some of the Melitz-model trade °ows the errors on other °ows in the bilateral
matrix become larger. (Norman (1990) reached a similar conclusion nearly 20 years ago.)
4 Conclusion
Arkolakis et al. (2008) analyze a single sector model with heterogeneous-¯rms and con-
cluded that new theories \do not really o®er new gains from trade, given observed trade
levels." We replicate this ¯nding in comparing Armington and Melitz formulations with
iceberg trade costs. Provided that the labor supply elasticity is zero and the Armington
elasticity of substitution equal to one plus the Melitz Pareto-shape parameter, these mod-
els are idential. This result is, however, fragile. If the labor-supply elasticity is di®erent
than zero the industrial organization begins to matter. Firm entry and import variety
e®ects become important if the labor-supply elasticity is not zero.
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